Yemen's Military Zones: A Battle of Dual Commands

Yemen today is not only a country divided by ideology but also by parallel military command systems. The internationally recognized government in Aden divided the nation into seven military regions since 2013, each controlling brigades of infantry, armored units, artillery, air defense, naval bases, and airfields. Recently, Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, announced the formation of an Eighth Military Region, covering the provinces of Ibb, Dhamar, and Al-Bayda. This move responded to growing chaos among state forces and competing factions.

As the Houthis consolidated control in Sa’dah and western territories, they built their own de facto military structure, dividing areas by provinces and operational needs. Under Mahdi al-Mashat, the head of their Supreme Political Council, the Houthi military is led by Defense Minister Mohammad al-Atifi and key loyalists from the al-Houthi family, such as Abdul Khaliq al-Houthi, overseeing elite Republican Guard units and Special Forces.

The Aden government’s military structure, despite its official seven-region framework, remains fractured by dominant groups like the Giants Brigades, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), al-Amaliqah forces, and "Dr’a al-Watan" units. The STC, led by Aidarus al-Zubaidi, took firm control over Aden and much of the south since 2017. They established their military wing through the Security Belt Forces and Southern Infantry Brigades under Brigadier Ali al-Bishi, integrated within the Presidential Council but politically pushing for southern independence.

The new Eighth Military Region headquartered in Qa’atabah, northern Dhale, aims to consolidate Aden's authority but may instead spark new clashes. Major General Hadi Al-Awlaqi and Colonel Adil Al-Shaibah command a region caught between government troops, STC units, and local militias, intensifying control struggles over critical road and supply routes.

In northern and western Yemen, the Houthis have maintained six operational provinces and effectively replaced the government’s official regional military system. They organized military sectors based on provincial lines and factional alliances, maintaining loyalty through the Supreme Political Council and their Iranian network.

Meanwhile, the STC’s growing monopoly in the south makes Aden a semi-autonomous military entity, following a structure different from both the Houthi and Aden frameworks. Roughly estimated, Aden-STC controls 3–4 brigades directly, while the Presidential Council claims seven military regions plus the newly added eighth. Houthi forces maintain 200,000 to 350,000 trained fighters, with Republican Guards, special forces, and cross-provincial brigades.

The map above visualizes this: green areas controlled by the Houthis, red by Hadhramaut tribal alliances, yellow by STC and its affiliates, gray for joint government-Hadi forces, and purple marking the National Resistance and Ta’izz’s independent military axis. It starkly illustrates a dual reality, with military command splinters and shifting allegiances.

The creation of an Eighth Military Region in a small country opens doors for rapid tactical and strategic shifts, based on resource access and foreign backers. The Houthis have Iranian support, including from the Quds Force. The STC enjoys Emirati backing. While Saudi Arabia anchors the official government, battlefronts reveal a much more fractured picture.

Control over civil defense, logistics routes, and coastal border posts is critical. The Houthis already developed missile-launching capabilities targeting the Red Sea. Aden-STC forces anticipate building their own naval bases. The central zone, where the Eighth Military Region lies, becomes a prized theater for competing military logistics.

The sustainability of these dual military structures relies heavily on Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s political will. If they waver, STC might formally secede again. Should Iran double down on its support, the Houthis will further entrench their control. Regional geopolitics and shifting loyalties among local commanders will determine whether they merge or defect.

This division highlights that Yemen’s conflict isn’t just a binary war but an ongoing contest between dual military hierarchies. Unless the central government recognizes the fragmented nature of local command structures, civil war may drag on endlessly. In the end, roads, oil terminals, and port access, not ideology, will dictate who governs.

Scenario: A Joint Peace Forum

Amidst this fragmented battlefield, analysts suggest a new strategy: a multi-party joint military forum. The Presidential Leadership Council, Houthis, STC, and tribal leaders could convene a neutral dialogue overseen by the UN or Oman.

The idea is to draft a regional ceasefire agreement, recognizing the control zones of each party while gradually merging certain security tasks like port security, airport management, and humanitarian convoy protection.

Under this plan, Aden’s Eighth Military Region would function as a demilitarized buffer, ensuring unrestricted road access from Sana’a to Aden. Houthi forces would pull heavy artillery 20 km back from city centers, while STC militias agree to halt new brigade formations.

Prisoner exchanges and mine-clearing operations would become a joint responsibility. The Giants Brigades and Southern Infantry would jointly secure oil roads in Shabwa with an oversight committee from Oman.

Regional military training centers could host integrated officer courses, promoting shared doctrine and rules of engagement, overseen by neutral international observers.

The forum would prioritize rebuilding destroyed military hospitals and demobilizing child soldiers from all factions. Compensation funds could be established by Gulf donors, under UN supervision.

Airspace management over Yemen would fall to a joint control room in Aden with representatives from all sides, reducing accidental airstrikes and securing flight paths for aid deliveries.

Additionally, tribal sheikhs would receive formal roles as civilian liaisons between military commanders and local communities, ensuring grievances are addressed before escalating into armed clashes.

By year two, the forum would initiate phased disarmament talks, starting with militia-held towns and focusing on integrating loyal fighters into national police and border guard units.

Such a peace forum may not end all hostilities but could offer a transitional framework where local autonomy is respected, while central coordination gradually resumes over time.

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