Yemen’s Military Industry Divided Across Two Regions

Yemen’s military industry is now facing a fragmented reality, split into two main centers. One is in the capital, Sanaa, controlled by the Houthi government, while the other is in Aden under the internationally recognized Yemeni government, operating under the supervision of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).

This division has had a significant impact on the production and distribution of military equipment. In Sanaa, the facilities that were previously under the Armed Forces’ Military Manufacturing Authority focus on producing light armored vehicles, ammunition, small arms, and drones for reconnaissance and combat operations.

Some of the armored vehicles produced in Sanaa include the Qatish 1 and 2 and the Jalal 3. The production of light firearms, sniper rifles, and machine guns continues despite shortages of spare parts due to embargoes and sanctions.

Sanaa is also known for its drone engineering teams, which have developed relatively advanced unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and attack purposes. However, many drone engineers have died under mysterious circumstances in recent years, sparking speculation about sabotage or targeted operations against Houthi technological development.

Meanwhile, in Aden, the military industry under the PLC focuses on logistics vehicles, armored vehicles, ammunition, and small arms production for loyalist forces. The PLC continues to produce local versions of rifles and light weapons, including vehicles like the Jalal series for armored transport.

Some key figures in Aden’s military manufacturing sector have also met tragic ends. Major General Hassan bin Jalal al-Obeidi, the director of the Military Manufacturing Department under the PLC, was found dead in his Cairo apartment. His death adds to the list of mysterious fatalities affecting senior military officers and technicians under the PLC.

Aden produces logistic vehicles such as the UAZ-469 and Gaz-2975. These vehicles are used for troop transport, supply runs, and rapid mobilization in conflict zones. The PLC also oversees the production of small- and medium-caliber ammunition to sustain combat readiness.

In Sanaa, light armored vehicles like Humaydah and the Jalal series continue to serve as key assets for Houthi forces. Local production of firearms adapts to battlefield needs, allowing the Houthis to maintain operational capability despite restrictions.

Both factions continue to develop drones for reconnaissance and offensive operations. Sanaa’s drones are known for locally adapted modifications, while the PLC relies more on technical support and imported components from international allies.

Logistics coordination has been affected by this division. Sanaa struggles with raw material shortages, limiting large-scale production. Aden, while more stable, faces threats from ongoing conflict and political pressure, along with the external security environment.

The deaths of drone engineers in Sanaa and senior officers in Aden raise serious concerns about the vulnerability of Yemen’s military technology sector to covert operations and sabotage, adding uncertainty to the future of both regions’ military industries.

Under the PLC, the Jalal 1, 2, and 3 armored vehicles remain a strategic production focus. Localized production of weapons like MP-18 and MP-40 continues to equip infantry units. Some facilities also produce medium- and heavy-caliber ammunition to support combat operations.

In Sanaa, the Qatish 1 and 2 and Humaydah vehicles focus on rapid mobility in mountainous terrain and urban areas. Firearms such as Gewehr 43, Vickers, and Dragunov rifles are locally manufactured with modifications tailored to combat conditions.

The mysterious deaths of figures like al-Obeidi and several drone engineers highlight the high risks facing key personnel in Yemen’s military industry. Incidents in Cairo and unexplained fatalities in Sanaa represent dark chapters in the country’s defense sector history.

The fragmentation has left Yemen’s military capacity divided, with each faction adjusting production strategies based on its regional capabilities. Sanaa adapts with limited resources, focusing on light armored vehicles and drones, while Aden leverages international support to maintain logistics and small arms production.

For the Houthis, drone self-sufficiency is a strategic priority, though sabotage and mysterious deaths hinder technological advancement.

The PLC in Aden, while relatively more secure, faces continuous security pressures in key cities and must ensure the steady supply of raw materials. Losing senior officers such as al-Obeidi deals a severe blow to the PLC’s military manufacturing operations.

This division shows that internal conflict not only disrupts the battlefield but also undermines technological development and national defense capabilities. The future of Yemen’s military industries depends on the security of key personnel and political stability, which remain uncertain.

If stability is achieved, the experience gained in local manufacturing in both Sanaa and Aden could serve as a foundation to rebuild Yemen’s national defense capability. Yet, challenges remain, including external threats, mysterious deaths of critical personnel, and a prolonged fragmented industry.

Potential Defense Industry Under the STC

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) in southern Yemen also has significant potential to develop its own defense industry. Focused primarily around Aden and southern governorates, the STC could leverage local engineering expertise, former military personnel, and access to maritime routes to develop logistics vehicles, light armored vehicles, and small arms production.

With international recognition limited but strategic access to ports, the STC could attract investment in defense technology and establish small drone development programs. If coordinated with the PLC and supported by allies, the STC could emerge as a regional hub for military manufacturing in southern Yemen, complementing Aden’s existing facilities.

This development, however, depends on political consolidation in the south, security stability, and the ability to protect engineers and key personnel from targeted attacks or sabotage, lessons learned from both Sanaa and Aden experiences.

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